ABSTRACT The goal of this paper is to investigate the security performance of the multi-antenna unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-enabled mobile relaying system with a multi-antenna destination in the presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper. To improve the secrecy outage probability performance, we propose a location-based three dimensional (3D) beamforming scheme without the channel state information of the destination and the eavesdropper. To this end, we first derive the expression of the secrecy outage probability for uniform linear arrays (ULAs) and uniform circular arrays (UCAs), which is valid for arbitrary values of system parameters. The expression is practicable in the UAV-enabled mobile relaying system as the system parameters are time-variant with the movement of the UAV. Using this expression, we study the secrecy outage probability minimization problem by optimizing the 3D beamforming direction along with the trajectory of the UAV, subject to the mobility constraint and location constraint. To solve this problem, an efficient iterative algorithm is proposed. The numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms by comparing to other benchmark schemes, they also show the system with UCAs outperforms the system with ULAs on secrecy outage probability performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) attract much attention in many areas, for UAVs are cost-effective and operate easily now [1] - [3] . In some scenarios, such as search-and-rescue in disaster, emergency inspection, and high risk tactical communication, it is effective to deploy UAV as a relay [4] , [5] . Due to involved data of these missions are sensitive, the relay UAV is an interesting target for cyber attack. On the other hand, the channel in UAV communication system, UAV-UAV link or UAV-ground control station (GCS) link, is wireless communication channel, which is vulnerable to eavesdroppers. It is necessary to develop an efficient secure communication infrastructure to protect signals between UAVs and equipments on the ground, and physical layer security is a good option. Deploying the UAV as a mobile relay, i.e., UAV-enabled mobile relaying, can adjust the relay's location adaptively to enhance the physical layer security performance [6] , [7] .
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Pioneered by Wyner et al. [8] , physical layer security exploit characters of wireless channel to achieve secure communication without secret key encryption. In the existing studies on physical layer security, different techniques were investigated, such as artificial noise [9] - [11] , beamforming [12] , [13] , and antenna selection [14] , [15] . In the aforementioned works, many assume the channel state information (CSI) of the link between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver is known to the transmitter [9] , [10] , [12] , some assume the CSI of the link between the transmitter and the eavesdropper is available at the transmitter [13] , [14] . However, these assumptions are difficult to achieve in reality, especially in the UAV-enabled relaying system, for its high mobility and altitude. In such a scenario, it is promising to exploit the use of location information to enhance the secrecy performance in the UAV-enabled relaying system. It is noted that the location information of any ground nodes, including the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, can be obtained via an optical camera or synthetic aperture radar (SAR) equipped on the UAV [16] , [17] .
The use of location information on the secrecy performance enhancement has been recently investigated in [18] - [20] . Compared with them, our contributions are fourfold. First, instead of two-dimension (2D) locationbased beamforming, we propose three-dimension (3D) location-based beamforming, in which the horizontal beamforming angle and the vertical beamforming angle can be adapted instantaneously due to the fact that the immediate angle adjustment electronically is feasible to feed identical signals having appropriate phase shift with multiple antenna elements [21] . Because of the 3D nature of the wireless channels in the UAV-enabled mobile relaying system, with 3D directional antennas in the UAV, 3D beamforming [22] - [24] can fully exploit the secrecy degrees of freedom in the signal transmission. Second, we derive the expression of secrecy outage probability in the UAV-enabled mobile relaying system with multi-input, multi-output, multieavesdropper (MIMOME), which is valid for arbitrary values of system parameters. Third, we jointly design the beamforming direction and the trajectory of the UAV. As the secrecy outage probability is time-variant with the movement of the UAV, it is essential to optimize the UAV's trajectory for secrecy performance enhancement in the system. Fourth, we compare the secrecy outage probability performance of the systems when uniform linear arrays (ULAs) and uniform circular array (UCAs) are utilized.
In this paper, we propose a location-based 3D beamforming scheme in UAV-enabled mobile relaying system, in which the trajectory and the beamforming direction of the UAV are optimized to minimize the secrecy outage probability of the system. Furthermore, we assume that all of the communication channels in this paper are in a Rician fading environment. It is noted that this assumption is reasonable in the UAVenabled mobile relaying system.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model. In Section III, we formulate the secrecy outage probability minimization problem. Section IV details the proposed algorithm. In Section V, numerical results are presented. Section VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig.1 , we consider a UAV-enabled mobile relaying system model consists of a GCS, a high mobility UAV for data relaying, a destination expecting to receive message from the GCS, and a passive eavesdropper trying to get message when the UAV is relaying. Due to distance or blockage such as terrain or buildings, which is reasonable in military scenario or in rescue after disaster, the direct link between the GCS and the destination is too weak to provide reliable communication, we focus on the signal transmission from the UAV to the destination and the eavesdropper. In this model, all nodes are equipped with ULAs or UCAs, the UAV has N U antenna elements, the destination has N D antenna elements and the eavesdropper has N E antenna elements. The user and the eavesdropper receive the message from the UAV by maximal-ratio-combining (MRC). We regard the channel between the UAV and the destination as legitimate channel, Without loss of generality, we consider a three dimensional Cartesian coordinate system model depicted in Fig.1 , in which the GCS located at (0, 0, 0), the destination located at (x d , y d , 0), the eavesdropper located at (x e , y e , 0). Assuming the hovering height of the UAV is fixed at H , thus, the UAV has a time-varying coordinate, which can be expressed as (x(t), y(t), H ) , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where x(t) and y(t) denote the instantaneous x-and y-coordinates of the UAV. T is the time for hovering and is discretized into N equal spaced time-slots, i.e., T = NT s , where T s is small sufficiently so the location of UAV can be considered as approximately constant in each time-slot. Thus, the trajectory of UAV, i.e., {x(t), y(t)}, can be approximated by sequences {x[n], y[n]} N n=1 . As per the aforementioned assumptions, we denote y i [n], i ∈ {D, E} as the signal received by the destination (i = D) or the eavesdropper (i = E), which can be written as
where P is the transmit power of the UAV,
represents the data symbol transmitted by the UAV in time-slot n,
is the additive white Gaussian noise vector (N i ×1) at the destination or the eavesdropper with zero mean and variance matrix σ 2 i I N i . We assume the channels in this model follow the free-space path loss model, the channel path loss coefficient in time-slot n, g i [n], can be expressed as
where d i [n] denotes the distance from the UAV to the destination or the eavesdropper in time-slot n, β 0 is the channel power gain at the reference distance of
is the path loss exponent of the legitimate channel or the eavesdropping channel in time-slot n. VOLUME 7, 2019 H i [n] in (1) can be expressed as
where K i [n] denotes the Rician K -factor of the legitimate channel or the eavesdropping channel in time-slot n, 
where
is the elevation angle of the legitimate channel or the eavesdropping channel, α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , β 1 , β 2 and β 3 are environment and frequency dependent constants.
In (6) When ULA is adopted, the array responses in (6) can be written as [27] - [28] 
where τ = 2π/λ, λ is the wavelength, ρ i is the antenna spacing at the destination or the eavesdropper, ρ U is the antenna spacing at the UAV, [ ] T indicates the vector transpose,
denotes the azimuth angle-of-arrival (AOA) from the UAV to the destination or the eavesdropper in time-slot n, θ i [n] denotes the elevation AOA from the UAV to the destination or the eavesdropper in time-slot n, α i [n] denotes the azimuth angle-of-departure (AOD) from the UAV to the destination or the eavesdropper in time-slot n, ζ i [n] denotes the elevation AOD from the UAV to the destination or the eavesdropper in time-slot n. We can calculate these angles through the location information in each time-slot. When UCA is used, the array responses in (6) can be written as [27] , [29] 
where r i is the circular radius of the antenna array at the destination or the eavesdropper, r U is the circular radius of the antenna array at the UAV,
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we consider the secrecy outage probability minimization problem in the model described in Section II, subject to the mobility constraint and the location constraint.
To this end, we first derive the easy-to-evaluate expression of the secrecy outage probability, which is valid for arbitrary values of system parameters. We formulate the optimization problem in the second part of this section.
A. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this model, the achievable secrecy rate is expressed as [30] 
is the capacity of the eavesdropping channel in time-slot n, γ D [n] denotes the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the legitimate channel in time-slot n, γ E [n] denotes the SNR of the eavesdropping channel in time-slot n. γ i [n], i ∈ {D, E} is given by
When the destination and the eavesdropper employ MRC to receive signals from the UAV, the secrecy outage probability is [15] 
To derive the expression of the secrecy outage probability, we first need to obtain f γ D [n] (γ ) and f γ E [n] (γ ). Since the PDF of a Rician RV is not suitable for deriving the secrecy outage probability, we interpret the Rician fading as a special case of Nakagami fading [19] . When the CSI of the legitimate channel and the eavesdropping channel is not known to the UAV, MRC is employed at the destination and the eavesdropper, the PDF of γ i [n] is given by [31] (14) 26490 VOLUME 7, 2019 where (x) = ∞ 0 e −t t x−1 dt, Re (x) > 0 is the Gamma function, m i [n] and γ i [n] are expressed as [19] , [32] 
The secrecy outage probability of the 3D location-based beamforming scheme for a given R S in the UAV-enabled mobile relaying system with MIMOME is (17) where the generalized Gamma function G (x) is given by [33] 
and u j can be expressed as [34] u j
Proof: According to (14) , we get (20) 
Substituting (14) and (20) into (13), the secrecy outage probability is derived as (21) in which [34, eq. (3.381-4)] is employed.
We note that the location information and the beamforming vector are embedded in (17) , which means the secrecy outage probability is variant in each time-slot along with the movement of the UAV. On the other hand, different from [15] , (17) is valid for arbitrary real m i [n], which is more feasible for the UAV-enabled mobile relaying system. Moreover, the two infinite series in (17) series in (17) at the K -th and J -th terms, for the efficient calculation of the secrecy outage probability. The relative approximation error can be written as
where P s (R S )[n] can be calculated by substituting (14) into (13) and the evaluation error of (13) is less than 10 −10 .
Our numerical results show that e is less than 10 −3 when K = 10 and J = 5, and e is around 10 −6 when K = 20 and J = 5. VOLUME 7, 2019
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
When ULA is adopted, b[n] can be expressed as [28] b 
Our objective is to minimize the secrecy outage probability in each time-slot by jointly optimizing the UAV's trajectory and beamforming direction, subject to the mobility constraint and the location constraint of the UAV. We assume the UAV is flying at a constant speed, then the mobility constraint of the UAV can be expressed as
Furthermore, we suppose the initial location of the UAV is at the hovering height above the GCS, and the final location of the UAV is {x d , y[N ]}, −500 ≤ y[N ] ≤ 500, thus the location constraint of the UAV can be expressed as
Now, the optimization problem can be formulated as follows.
IV. PROPOSED ALGORITHM
We note that (P1) cannot be solved by directly applying standard optimizing technique, due to (17) is a complicated non-convex function. To make a progress, we decompose (P1) into two sub-problems, namely trajectory optimization with fixed beamforming direction and beamforming direction optimization with fixed trajectory. Based on the algorithms for two sub-problems, we propose an iterative algorithm for (P1) via alternately optimizing the beamforming direction and trajectory.
A. TRAJECTORY OPTIMIZATION WITH FIXED BEAMFORMING DIRECTION
In this subsection, we focus on the sub-problem for optimizing the coordinate of the UAV in each time-slot, subject to the mobility constraint and the location constraint, while its beamforming direction is assumed to be fixed. To solve this sub-problem, we assume
} denote the trajectory incremental in time-slot n. Besides, we note that ε[n] is always positive in reality. Then this sub-problem can be formulated as
We find that the location of time-slot n is on the edge of a semicircle, while the center of the semicircle is the location of time-slot n-1 and the radius of the semicircle is vT s . Consequently, we note that (P2) can be solved by finding the optimal heading angle τ [n] in each time-slot, and 0 ≤ τ [n] ≤ π. We highlight that it is an efficient way of trajectory planning by optimizing the heading angle, due to it involves a one-dimensional search of τ [n] only. The detailed algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.
B. BEAMFORMING DIRECTION OPTIMIZATION WITH FIXED TRAJECTORY
In this subsection, we focus on the sub-problem that optimizing the beamforming direction of the UAV in each time-slot, while its trajectory is assumed to be fixed. Note this sub-problem may correspond to the practical scenario when the trajectory of the UAV is pre-determined. This sub-problem is formulated as follows.
To solve (P3) efficiently, we optimize the horizontal beamforming direction and the vertical beamforming direction successively. In detail, we firstly adopt an exhaustive search over the region [0, π] to find the optimal ω[n], (the vertical beamforming angle is fixed at π/2, i.e., 2D beamforming optimization). With the optimal horizontal beamforming angle, we adopt an exhaustive search over the region [0, π/2] to find the optimal ω[n]. The detailed algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2. In Algorithm 2, p n um = π/delta + 1, q n um = π/(2delta) + 1, delta is the search step length. We note that the solution from Algorithm 2 leads to a performance Based on Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, we proposed the joint optimization of the trajectory and the beamforming direction for the secrecy outage probability minimization in each time-slot as described in Algorithm 3. 
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the performance of proposed algorithms is evaluated through Monte Carlo simulation. 3D directional antennas are assumed at the UAV. We consider a low-altitude searching model in this paper, where the destination is located at (2000m, 0, 0), x d in (27) is set as 2000m, the flying altitude of the UAV is set as 400m, and the speed of the UAV is 80km/h. In practical, the GCS is always a vehicle below 3m, thus it is reasonable to neglect its height. The transmit power at the relay UAV is set as 10dBm, while the noise powers at the destination and the eavesdropper are assumed as -90dBm equally. The antenna spacing of all ULAs is set as 6.25cm, and the circular radius of all UCAs is set as 10cm. The setting of antennas is widely used and the comparability of ULAs and UCAs has been explained elsewhere [28] , [29] , [35] . The environment parameters used in the channel model are set to α 1 = −1, α 2 = 3, α 3 = 5, β 1 = 44, β 2 = 9, and β 3 = 2 ln 3/π as in [25] . Other system parameters are detailed in each subsection.
A. COMPARISON OF SCHEMES
In this subsection, we compare the secrecy outage probabilities of different schemes when ULAs or UCAs are used. In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 , we present five schemes in our system model to illustrate the secrecy performance enhancement of the proposed algorithms. In the ''ULA-1'' (''UCA-1'') scheme, the beamforming direction is fixed (ω[n] = 30 • , φ[n] = 10 • ) when ULAs (UCAs) are adopted without any design, while in the ''ULA-2'' (''UCA-2'') scheme, the horizontal beamforming angle and the vertical beamforming angle are adjusted to the location of the destination immediately without trajectory planning. ''ULA-TWB'' (''UCA-TWB'') represents that the trajectory is optimized without beamforming direction optimization, and ''ULA-BWT'' (''UCA-BWT'') represents that the beamforming direction is optimized when the trajectory of the UAV is predetermined (we assume the UAV flies unidirectional from GCS to the destination). The ''ULA-TB'' (''UCA-TB'') scheme is defined as the trajectory and the beamforming direction are jointly optimized by Algorithm 3.
As shown in Fig. 2 , ''ULA-1'' has the worst secrecy performance, ''ULA-TB'' achieve the best performance. The comparison of these strategies validate the effectiveness of our algorithms. Fig. 3 shows the analogous situation when UCAs are used. It is worth noting that when comparing Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 , we can find that the system with UCAs outperforms the system with ULAs on secrecy outage probability performance. Our theoretical analysis has been verified in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 , for presentation convenience, its correctness will not be confirmed again in the following figures.
B. IMPACT OF ANTENNA NUMBER Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show the secrecy outage probability of our system with different antenna numbers at each node. ''U2D2E2'' represents that the UAV has two antennas, the destination has 2 antennas, and the eavesdropper has 2 antennas. Other curves have the similar meaning. As expected, the secrecy outage probability increases as the antenna number of the eavesdropper increases, and the secrecy outage probability decreases as the antenna number of the UAV or the destination increases. On the other hand, when the antenna number of the UAV increases, both of the received power at the destination and the eavesdropper increases, while the received power at the destination increases individually when the antenna number of the destination increases, that is why the secrecy outage probability of ''U2D3E2'' decreases faster than the secrecy outage probability of ''U3D2E2''. Furthermore, from the comparison of results in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 , we can observe that the system with UCAs outperforms the system with ULAs on secrecy outage probability performance.
C. IMPACT OF LOCATION
In Fig. 6 , we plot the secrecy outage probability of our algorithm when eavesdropper is at different location. ''ULA-1'' (''UCA-1'') means the eavesdropper is located at (1800m, 0, 0) with ULAs (UCAs), ''ULA-2'' (''UCA-2'') means the eavesdropper is located at (2200m, 0, 0) with ULAs (UCAs). Based on the secrecy outage probability in some other locations, we conclude that the secrecy outage probability decreases when the destination is closer to the UAV in our system. This is because a better legitimate channel is obtained when the destination is closer to the UAV. Fig. 7 shows the trajectories of the UAV with corresponding eavesdropper's location in Fig. 6 . It is observed that when the UAV is far from the destination and the eavesdropper, all the trajectories are similar, i.e., the UAV flies from the GCS to the destination in a straight direction. As the UAV is closer to the eavesdropper, it will fly as far away as possible to the eavesdropper and at the same time as close as possible to the destination.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a location-based 3D beamforming scheme in the UAV-enabled mobile relaying system to improve the security performance. When the CSI of the legitimate channel and the eavesdropping channel is unknown to the UAV, we derive the expression of the secrecy outage probability of our system with MIMOME, which is valid for arbitrary values of system parameters. Furthermore, an efficient iterative algorithm is proposed to minimize the secrecy outage probability under the mobility constraint and the location constraint, via jointly optimizing the trajectory of the UAV and the 3D beamforming direction in each time-slot. Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms, they also show the system with UCAs outperforms the system with ULAs on secrecy outage probability performance. The results in this paper can be extended by considering the power allocation, antennas selection, artificial noise, adaptive bandwidth allocation, etc., which will be left as future work.
